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1. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the. Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Tohnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-57 was launched at 9:07 a.m. local 6/21/93
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S1.0 Summary 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 19 June 1993. The detailed walkdown of Launch 
Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-105 Endeavour (4th flight), ET-58 (LWT 51), and BI-059 
SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 20 June 1993. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria 
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the 
established data base. The External Tank exhibited light 
condensate on the TPS acreage. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak 
sensor detected no significant hydrogen leakage during the 
cryoload. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips were visible 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The launch was scrubbed at T-5 minutes (and holding) due to 
RTLS and TAL weather. A post drain inspection of the vehicle 
revealed no significant anomalies and the ET appeared ready for 
the next cryoload. 
A repeat of the pre-launch debris inspection had not been 
planned since the MLP deck was subject to controlled access. 
. The vehicle was cryoloaded a second time on 21 June 1993. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 criteria 
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the 
established data base. The External Tank exhibited light 
condensate on the TPS acreage. No unusual vapors or cryogenic 
drips were visible during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch. 
After the 9:07 a.m. launch on 21 June 1993, a debris inspection 
of Pad 39A was performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials 
were found with the exception of a frangible nut web on the 
stud in holddown post (HDP) #2. EPON shim material on the south 
holddown posts was intact. There was no visual indication of a 
stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown posts. No frangible 
nut/ordnance fragments were found. Damage to the facility 
overall was minimal. 
A total of 133 films and videos were analyzed as part of the 
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight 
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No 
stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. Two 
frangible nut pieces fell from the HDP #2 DOS/stud hole after 
liftoff. All T-0 umbilicals operated properly. 
On-orbit imagery, ET/ORB umbilical cameras and the flight crew 
• handheld photography, revealed nominal SRB and ET separations. 
The lightning contact strip was missing from the top of the L02 
ET/ORB umbilical (the others were intact) . TPS damage had 
occurred on the top inboard section of the umbilical.
The red purge seal was missing from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
near the 4-inch disconnect (still attached to the Orbiter after 
landing) and at the top outboard section. A piece of white RTV 
drifting by the camera lens may also have originated from the 
top outboard section. TPS damage had occurred on the inboard 
side of the umbilical and a large piece of foam, which measured 
approximately 2 feet long by 4 inches wide by as much as 1 inch 
thick, had partially separated from the umbilical. TPS on the 
top surface of the umbilical had peeled back in two places. 
At least 70 divots, 3-4 inches in diameter, occurred on the 
intertank stringer heads forward of the bipods. Seven small 
divots were visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout between the bipods. Both +Y and -Y bipod ramps and 
jack pad closeouts were intact. Nine divots, 6-8 inches in 
diameter, occurred along a line on the -Y thrust panel on the 
+Z side of the EB fitting. Nine smaller divots were scattered 
on the -Y thrust panel on the -z side of the EB fitting. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. The RH frustum had 46 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners 
and two areas of missing MSA-2. The LH frustum was missing no 
TPS, but had 27 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. All eight Debris 
Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated. No malfunction 
of the HDP #2 DCS was apparent even though two frangible nut 
pieces had fallen from the stud hole after liftoff (as observed 
in the film review). 
A post landing inspection of OV-105 was conducted after the 
landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 106 hits, 
of which 12 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 75 hits, of which 10 had a 
major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these numbers 
and comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar 
configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the 
number of hits one inch or larger was less• than average. 
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1 and EO-3 appeared to have 
functioned properly. The EO-2 debris plunger was obstructed by 
ordnance fragments. 
A 15-inch long piece of foam with red purge seal, which should 
have remained with the ET during separation, adhered to the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical near the 4-inch flapper valve. A 3" x 1" piece 
of ET foam adhered to a tile on the RH ET door near the hinge 
line. The foam had been compressed into the thermal barrier 
when the door was closed, but apparently did not affect the 
seal. 
A 7/16" x 3/32" screw from the purge barrier retainer lay on 
the runway below the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cavity. A nutplate 
with threads matching the screw was found wedged in a cavity on 
the ET door.
A walkdown of KSC Runway 33 was performed immediately after 
landing. No debris or unexpected flight hardware was found. All 
drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to be in good 
condition. 
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a 
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples from sources 
such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM exhaust residue, window covers and 
processing, natural landing site products, organics, and paint. 
These residual sampling data do not indicate a single source of 
damaging debris since no damage has been associated with the 
sampled material. Additionally, most of the observed materials 
have previously been documented in post-landing sample reports. 
The residual sample data also showed no debris trends when 
compared to previous mission data. 
A total of 17 Post Launch Anomalies, including six IFA 
candidates, were observed during the STS-57 mission assessment. 
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2.0 PRE-LA1JNCH BRIEFING
	
. 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 18 June 1993 at 1430 hours 
with the following key personnel present: 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
W. Atkinson RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
R. Hillard MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
M. Nowling MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
S. Otto M4SS- LSS ET Processing 
D. Maxwell LSOC - SPC Safety
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
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2.1 PRE-LAUNCE SSVIPAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
• was conducted on 19 June 1993 from 0910 - 1050 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (4th flight), ET-58 
(LWT 51), and BI-059 SRB' s. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies or debris issues. A 
Problem Report was taken to document damaged foam on the ET 
helium inject box. The PR was subsequently dispositioned to 
accept the condition for flight. 
Four each composite material samples were U-bolted to the hand 
rails on the FSS 135, 175, 215, and 255 foot levels (east 
side) . The Debris Team evaluated each installation and found no 
debris concerns. 
Two items were entered in S0007, Appendix K: 1) a loose cable 
tray clamp on the FSS 255 foot level; 2) loose bolts and one 
missing nut under the ML? zero level raised decks around the 
SRB exhaust holes. 
•	 The ML? deck and areas under the raised 
swept/vacuumed again prior to launch to remove 
items, such as sand, rust flakes, and paint chips.
deck were 
small debris 
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Four each composite material samples were U-bolted to the 
hand rails on four levels of the FSS east side 
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3.0 SCRUB 
The launch of STS-57 was scrubbed at T-5 minutes and holding 
due to RTLS and TAL site weather. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryo].oaded vehicle was 
performed on 20 June 1993 from 0420 to 0550 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 75.7 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity:	 71.1 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 6.29 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 117 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers were intact, though the R4U and L2U 
covers had been wetted by vapors inside the thrusters. Less 
than usual ice/frost accumulations were present at the SS #1 
and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The base heat shield 
tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual tempera-
ture gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat 
shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME 
nozzles. 
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The STI 
portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case tempera-
tures between 78 and 80 degrees Fahrenheit (F) . In comparison, 
temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot 
radiometer ranged from 76 to 79 degrees F and the SRB Ground 
Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured temperatures of 
79-80 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 
degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean 
Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 79 degrees F, which 
was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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Figure 1. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE 
SUMMARY DATA	
. 
TIME: 
DATE: 
Figure 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPEPATURE 
SUMMARY DATA 
.	 TIME: 0400-05F0 
. 
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3.4 EXTERNAL T7NK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0115 to 1030 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
Light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulations, was observed 
by the Ice team on the L02 tank ogive. There were no TPS 
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The portable STI 
measured surface temperatures that averaged 72 degrees F on the 
ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, 
the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 71 
degrees F on the ogive and 63 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 63 degrees F on the ogive and 58 
degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in 
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank 
flanges. Typical ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors 
were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable 
STI measured an average surface temperature of 79 degrees F on 
the intertank. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The, portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 69 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 67 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 65 degrees F on the upper and 63 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 48 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank 
and 61 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A 6-8 
inch long by 3/8-inch wide crack was present in the -Y vertical 
strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout 
interface. This crack exhibited no offset and was not filled 
with ice or frost. The appearance of the crack was expected due 
to the elimination of the stress relief gap at the factory. A 
crack had a'.so appeared in the +Y thrust strut-to-longeron 
interface. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was äonfigured properly and was holding .,. 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation Of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
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12 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculatiori line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were covered 
with condensate. Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had ac-
cumulated on the top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical purge barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed 
on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was 
present on the forward outboard and aft pyrotechnic canister 
closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. Ice/frost had 
formed on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam 
plug closeout forward corner as a result of a small, cold purge 
gas leak. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which 
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08383 criteria, 
consisted of three OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 00]. documented a 6-8 inch long by 3/8-inch wide crack 
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface near the 
longeron closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and 
was not filled with ice or frost. 
Anomaly 002 documented a crack in the thrust strut-to-longeron 
interface (+Y side). 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the LH2 feedlirie bellows, recirculation line bellows and 
burst discs, the ET/ORB LH2 and L02 uxnbilicals, LO2 feedlinse 
bellows and support brackets. 
3.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the .,P 
deck or in the-SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T.-0 
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent 
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had 
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of 
the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible afteE the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles were present. onthe GOX 
vent ducts at the time of launch.
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Ice/frost accumulations in the L02 feedline bellows 
and support brackets was typical 
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An 8-inch long by 3/8-inch widc crack occurred in the -Y 
vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron S closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. The presence of the crack was accept-
able for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/()RB 
LH2 umbilical. No cryogenic drips or unusual vapors appeared 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
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3.6 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSPECTION 
The launch of STS-57 was scrubbed at T-5 minutes and holding 
due to RTLS and TAL site weather. A post drain inspection of 
the vehicle was performed at Pad-39B on 20 June 1993 from 1730 
to 1845 hours. 
There were no anomalies on the Orbiter, Solid Rocker Boosters, 
or launch pad/facility. 
There was no visible damage on the External •Tank nosecone or 
fairing. Three small areas of topcoat were missing from the -Y 
footprint area. The +Y footprint area was not accessible for 
inspection. The tumble valve cover was intact. 
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank, 
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage. 
Ice in the L02 feedline support brackets and bellows had 
melted. No loose foam or TPS damage was visible. 
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent 
LH2 tarik-to-intertank flange closeout foam. 
The 8 x 3/8-inch crack in the 
-Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable 
. tray forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Inspection) 
was still visible. A 5 x 1/8-inch crack was present in the +Y 
ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray aft surface TPS. The crack 
had an 1/8-inch offset, approximately, due to structural 
deflection. Further inspection revealed the crack continued 
into the vertical strut/LH2 tank crotch area and progressed 6 
inches upward within the BX-250 closeout. No ice was visible in 
the crack. 
Ice on the ET/SRB fittings, the L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
purge vents, the LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst 
disks, the LH2 feedline bellows, and the LH2 umbilical 17-inch 
flapper valve torque tool access port closeout plug had not yet 
completely melted. More ice than usual remained on the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondlines. 
Ice/frost spots that had formed on the aft dome -Z manhole 
cover closeouts during detanking had melted and no TPS damage 
was visible. 
No significant vehicle damage was observed during the external 
post drain inspection. Two PR's were generated as a result of 
this inspection: 1) missing topcoat in the footprint area; 2) 
5-inch crack in the +Y vertical strut cable tray TPS. 
S
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Post drain inspection revealed ice on the pyro canister purge 
vents, plate gap purge vents, LH2 recirculation line bellows, 
and LH2 feedline bellows - an expected condition. There were no 
TPS anomalies.
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4.0 LAUNCE 
STS-57 was launched at 13:07:21.989 GMT (9:07 a.m. local) on 
21 June 1993. 
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 21 June 1993 from 0510 to 0615 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 criteria 
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established 
data base. Ambient weather conditions at the time of the 
inspection were: 
Temperature:	 76.3 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity:	 76.7 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 4.2 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 147 Degrees 
Cryogenic loading of the External Tank began almost two hours 
late due to the replacement of a malfunctioning nitrogen 
regulator in the MLP. An inspection of the vehicle by the Ice 
Team was necessary since the ET had already experienced one 
• cryoloading. However, the regulator problem and a short launch 
window dictated the need for an abbreviated inspection of the 
vehicle. Expedited visual assessment with minimal' photography/ 
infrared temperature measurements was performed. 
4.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers, including the two. wet covers on the R4U 
and L2U nozzles, and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
Typical ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME #1 
heat shield-to-nozzle interface and drain line. Condensate was 
present on the SS engine mounted heat shields, but the base 
heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no 
unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine 
mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside 
the SSME nozzles. 
4.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) 
supplied by MTI was 79 degrees F, which was within the required 
range of 44-86 degrees F.
21
4.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0215 to 0900 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 4. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
The Ice Team observed no condensate or ice/frost accumulations 
on the L02 tank ogive. Some light condensate was present on the 
L02 tank barrel section. Due to an abbreviated inspection, an 
infrared scan of the vehicle was performed, but no spot or 
point measurements were taken. There were no TPS anomalies. The 
tumble valve cover was intact. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. One ice/frost spot appeared 
on a stringer at the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
Typical ice/frost accumulations, but no unusual vapors, were 
present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. 
There were no LH2 tank TFS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but rio ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A two 
inch diameter ice/frost accumulation, which had first appeared 
during the scrub drain, had formed on the -Y bipod spindle 
housing-to-ET interface bondline. 
A 6-8 inch long by 3/8-inch wide crack was again visible in the 
-Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. A 5-inch by 
1/4-inch wide crack occurred on the +Y vertical strut aft side 
TPS-to-ET interface bondline. The cracks exhibited no offset 
and were not filled with ice or frost. A crack was observed in 
the -Y thrust strut-to-longeron interface. These conditions 
were acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. Less than usual accumulations of 
ice/frost were present on the acreage areas of the umbilical. 
Formation of ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt pyro 
canister purge vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen 
purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. An ice/frost formation appeared at the 
LH2 recirculation line-to-LH2 tank aft dome interface. The LH2 
feedline bellows were wet with condensate and some frost was 
beginning to form.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the 
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/OR.B umbilical purge 
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro 
canister and plate gap purge vents. Light ice/frost was present 
on both the aft and forward outboard pyrotechnic canister 
closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. Cold purge gas 
was leaking from the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access 
port foam plug closeout forward corner. Ice/frost had formed as
	 - 
a result. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing had not been 
installed during the scrub turnaround. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which 
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria, 
consisted of six OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a frost spot in a stringer root at the 
LH2 tank-to-intertank splice (-Y-Z quadrant). 
Anomaly 002 documented a 2-inch diameter ice/frost spot with 
vapors on the outboard side of the -Y bipod spindle housing-
to-ET interface bondline. 
Anomaly 003 documented cracks in both +Y and -Y thrust strut-
to-longeron interfaces. 
Anomaly 004 documented a 6-8 inch long by 3/8-inch wide crack 
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near 
the longeron closeout. A 5-inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack 
occurred in the +Y vertical strut aft surface fl'S along the ET 
interface. The cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled 
with ice or frost. 
Anomaly 005 documented ice/frost formations on the aft hard 
point attach pad bondlines. 
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the ET/ORB umbilical pyro canister purge vents and LH2 
upper/outboard sections of the purge barrier (baggie), L02 
feedline support brackets and bellows, LH2 feedline bellows, 
recirculation line bellows and burst disks. 
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4.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
uxnbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent 
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had 
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of 
the umbilical carrier plate. 
The GOX seals were in nominal configuration. No ET nosecone/ 
footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent hood was 
retracted. No icicles were present on the GOX vent ducts at the 
time of launch. 
. 
.
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A 2-inch diameter ice/frost accumulation, which first appeared 
during drain, had formed on the -Y bipod spindle housing-to-ET 
interface bondline.
26
5.0 POST LAUNCH PD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP and FSS/RSS. was conducted 
on 21 June 1993 from Launch + 2 to 3-1/2 hours. 
A frangible nut web, 2-1/4" x 5/16", was found on the stud in 
holddowrt post (HDP) #2. A Q-felt plug from the Orbiter base 
heat shield was found on the southwest pad apron. 
Three metal facility items (1-3/8" x 1/4" bolt, 5/8" x 1/4" 
bolt, 7/8" diameter washer) lay on the MLP deck near HDP #8 
between the sound suppression water pipe and SRB exhaust hole. 
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP EPON shoe shim 
material was intact. There was no visual indication of a stud 
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north 
HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. Plume 
erosion of the covers was typical with the exception of the HDP 
#4 cover, which had several burn-through holes. The SRB aft 
skirt purge lines were in place, but slightly damaged. The SRB 
T-O umbilicals exhibited minor damage. 
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX 
vent arm sustained only minor damage. The GH2 vent line was 
latched on the eighth tooth of the latching mechanism and had 
no loose cables (static retract lanyard). The GH2 vent line 
appeared to have retracted nominally and showed typical signs 
of SRB plume impingement. The ET intertank access structure 
also sustained typical plume heating effects. 
Typical damage to the facility included: 
1. An aluminum ring, 3 inches in diameter, lay on the pad 
apron under the RSS. A 2-1/4" x 1/4" diameter flexible 
white tube with stainless steel clamp and UV detector 
cap were found in the SSME flame trench. 
2. A piece of porcelain, two cable tray clamps, a 16" long 
by 1/2" strip of aluminum, a FOD sign, a loose bolt, 
and a grating clamp were found on various levels of the 
FSS/RSS. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
All composite material samples on the FSS side 1, levels 135, 
175, 215, and 255 hand rails, were intact and undamaged. 
A walkdown of the pad acreage and beach was completed on 
22 June 1993. No flight hardware or TPS material was found. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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SRB plume erosion of the north HDP blast covers was typical 
with the exception of the HDP #4 cover, which had several 
burn-through holes.
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All composite material samples attached to the
FSS east side handrails were intact and undamaged 
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. A frangible nut web, 2-1/4" by 5/16", was found on the stud in holddown post #2. A Q-felt plug from the Orbiter base heat 
shield was found on the southwest ad aaron. 
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the 
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems 
engineers. Two IFA candidates were proposed as a result of the 
film review. 
6.1 L&UNcR FILM AND VIDEO SURX 
A total of 104 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm 
films, twenty 35mm films, four 70mm films, and thirty-nine 
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Free burning hydrogen drifted under the body flap prior to SS 
ignition. Frost covered the SS?Y nozzles. SSME ignition, Mach 
diamond formation, and gimbal profile appeared normal (C/S-2 
STI, OTV 151, 163, 170, 171, E-6, 19, 20) . Flashes occurred in 
the SSME plumes prior to and after T-0 (E-2, 3). 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SS cluster occurred during engine 
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-76, 77). 
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, 
stable replenish, ignition, liftoff, or tower clear (OTV 109, 
150, 154, 163, 164) 
Several pieces of ice from the GUCP area fell aft along the -z 
side of the tank after SSME ignition (E-4). 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 163). GUCP disconnect and 
retraction from the External Tank was normal (E-33, 34). The 
GH2 vent arm retracted and latched with no rebound (OTV 160). 
Some slack in the static retract lanyard caused the cable to 
contact the GUCP leg during latchback (E-41, 42, 48, 50) 
Excessive slack on the cable attached to the GUCP J2 electrical 
connector caused the cable to momentarily catch on a intertank 
access platform hand rail during retraction (E-42, 48). 
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. Two 
frangible nut pieces fell from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole after 
liftoff (E-8). A loose SRB sound suppression water trough cloth 
parts tag was visible near HDP #2 (E-8). The north holddown 
post blast covers closed normally. 
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A dark particle originated from the liD? #4 haunch area and was 
pulled into the SRB exhaust hole by aspiration (E-7, 15) 
Another debris object, two inches long, originated from the liD? 
#7 shoe area and moved in the direction of the SRB nozzle 
before falling into the SRB exhaust hole without contacting 
flight hardware (E-11). The aft skirt EPON shim did not appear 
to be missing any material. Seven thin, dark particles, most 
likely paint chips from the FSS, fell into the field of view 
near the camera lens (E-13) 
Several films showed apparent dark objects falling in the 
direction of the ML? deck from above (E-14, 18, 26). These 
objects are shadows cast by falling ice or water drops. 
Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all 
ML? rainbirds. 
Condensate/vapors trailed from the split in the rudder speed 
brake (E-52). 
Numerous (over 100) particles fell out of the RH SRB plume 
during and after the roll maneuver (E-59, 207). 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters as pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of RCS 
paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings 
(E-212, 220, 222) 
A light colored object first appeared (GMT 13:07:37.596) from 
an area behind the LH RCS stinger near the Orbiter aft fuselage 
and fell into the SRB plume. The object was most likely an RCS 
thruster paper cover (E-52, 222, TV-21B). 
Flashes, most likely debris-induced, occurred in the SSME plume 
during ascent (E-222, ET-204, ET-212). 
Movement of the body flap was similar to previous flights 
(E-207,212) 
Local flow condensation at various points on the vehicle was 
typical but distinctly visible due to the ambient atmospheric 
conditions (E-207, 208, 220, 222, TV-4B, TV-5, TV-13) 
Exhaust plume recirculation and SRB separation appeared nominal 
(E-208,212, TV-4B) 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts appeared normal. 
Main parachute deployment, reefing, inflation, and jettison at 
splash down was nominal. Nozzle severance debris was typical 
(E-301, 302)
. 
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Two frangible nut pieces fell from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole 
after liftoff.
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Excessive slack on the cable attached to the GUCP J2 electrical 
connector caused the cable to momentarily catch on an intertank 
access platform hand rail during retraction. 
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM MID VIDEO SUMMARY 
Thirty-seven handheld still images (DTO-0312) and video were 
obtained of the ET after separation from the Orbiter by the 
flight crew. OV-105 was equipped to carry two umbilical 
cameras. The 16mm camera with the 10mm lens was not flown in 
the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical due to a structural interference 
problem. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. 
SRB separation from the ET was nominal. No anomalies were 
observed on the LH SRB segment cases and joints, forward skirt, 
and frustum. The left forward BSM aero heat shield covers were 
fully opened and latched. 
ET separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. Pieces of ice, 
frozen hydrogen, and foam drifted by the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical 
camera. The BSM burn scars on the LO2 tank were typical. No 
anomalies were observed on the nosecone, LO2 tank acreage, LH2 
tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, flight door, bipod 
ramps, aft hard point, and aft dome acreage. Exhaust plume 
recirculation and aft dome heating caused the usual charring 
and "popcorning" of the NCFI foam. 
The lightning contact strip was missing from the top of the L02 
ET/ORB umbilical (the others were intact) . TPS damage had 
occurred on the top inboard section of the umbilical. Foam was 
missing from the top, bottom, and outboard sides of the cable 
tray (horizontal section). Eight TPS divots were visible in the 
cable tray vertical section. 
The red purge seal was missing from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
near the 4-inch disconnect (still attached to the Orbiter after 
landing) and at the top outboard section. A piece of white RTV 
drifting by the camera lens may also have originated from the 
top outboard section. TPS damage had occurred on the inboard 
side of the umbilical and a large piece of foam, which measured 
approximately 2 feet long by 4 inches wide byas much as 1 inch 
thick, had partially separated from the umbilical. TPS on the 
top surface of the umbilical had peeled back in two places. 
The red seals at both EO fittings (EO-2 and EO-3) were loose 
and dangling by the retaining cords. 
A divot, 6-8 inches in diameter, was present in the -Y (LH) 
longeron closeout. 
Foam was missing from the +Y thrust strut flange and primer! 
metal substrate was exposed.
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Three divots were present in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout +Y+Z quadrant: one near the L02 feedline; two below 
the +Y EB fitting. A divot, 10 inches in diameter, was present 
in the -Y+Z quadrant flange closeout below the -Y EB fitting 
with another divot, 6 inches in diameter, nearby in the -Y 
thrust panel acreage. An 8 inch divot was visible in the flange 
closeout near the -z axis. 
At least 70 small divots, 3-4 inches in diameter, occurred on 
intertank stringers forward of the bipods. Seven small divots 
were visible in the LM2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout 
between the bipods. Both +Y and -Y bipod ramps and jack pad 
closeouts were intact. 
Nine divots, 6-8 inches in diameter, occurred along a line on 
the -Y thrust panel on the +Z side of the EB fitting. As many 
as nine smaller divots were scattered on the -Y thrust panel on 
the -z side of the EB fitting (Add to existing IFA).
. 
. 
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near the 4-inch disconnect and at the top outboard section. TPS 
was damaged on the inboard side f the umbilical and a large 
piece of foam, which measured approximately 2 feet long by 4 
inches wide by as much as 1 inch thick, had partially separated 
from the umbilical. TPS on top of the umbilical had peeled back 
in two places.
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The lightning contact strip was missing from the top of the L02 
ET/ORB umbilical (the others were intact) . TPS was damaged on 
the top inboard side of the umbilical. The red seal at the EO 
fitting was loose and dangling by the retaining cord. Foam was 
missing from the +Y thrust strut flange and primer/metal 
substrate was exposed.
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.At least 70 small divots, 3-4 inches in diameter, occurred on 
the intertank stringers forward of the bipods. Seven small 
divots were visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout between the bipods.
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Nine divots occurred in a rough line along the edge of the -Y 
thrust panel. A divot is visible in the LH2 tarik-to-intertank 
flange closeout and the -Y longeron closeout. There were no TPS 
anomalies on the LH2 and L02 tank acreage. 
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6.3 LM4DING FILM MID VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of nine 35mm large format films, seven 16mm high speed 
films, and 10 videos were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when 
the landing gear was extended. Touchdown of the main gear was 
nominal. 
The drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before 
the nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment 
appeared nominal though the parachute risers contacted a tile 
on the vertical stabilizer "stinger". The drag chute door 
appeared to get caught in the RH wing tip vortex and landed 
near the east edge of the runway. A crosswind blew the drag 
chute to the right of the Orbiter centerline. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout. 
. 
.
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7.0 SEB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT. 	
. 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 23 June 1993 from 0900 to 
1100 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good 
condition. 
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRI S INSPECTION 
The RH frustum had 46 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and two 
areas of missing MSA-2 (between the 275 and 318 ring frames 
near the -Y axis). Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint had 
occurred in localized areas (Figure 5) . All BSM aero heat 
shield covers were locked in the fully opened position, though 
the two left cover attach rings had been bent by parachute 
riser entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt acreage was missing no TPS, but had one 
MSA-2 debond near the forward attach fitting. Both RSS antennae 
covers/phenolic base plates were intact though the -z plate had 
delaminated (Figure 6). Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint 
occurred on the systems tunnel cover and around the ET/SRB 
attach point. No pins were missing from the frustum severance 
ring. The forward separation bolt appeared to have separated 
cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
	 S 
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. Paint was missing from 
several areas on the forward segment. 
Separation of thf aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETAring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The K5NA closeout material on the upper strut fairing was 
intact. All three aft booster stiffener rings also appeared 
undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate 
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. The aft skirt acreage TPS was 
generally in good condition but was missing a 4"x3" piece of 
MSA-2 on ring frame 1894 fasteners near the single BSM (Figure 
7) 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated. 
No malfunction of the HDP #2 DCS was apparent even though two 
frangible nut pieces had fallen from the stud hole after lift 
off (as observed in the film review). None of the EPON shim 
material was missing prior to water impact. 
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stum had 4h MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and two 
areas of missing MSA-2. All BSM aero heatshield covers were 
locked in the fully opened position, though the two left cover 
attach rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. 
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Loss of MSA-2 TPS from a frustum fastener
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. The RH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 was missing no TPS, but had 
one MSA-2 debond near the forward attach fitting. Both RSS 
antenna covers/phenolic base plates were intact. 
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7.2 LH SOLID ROC1ET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 27 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint 
had occurred along the 395 ring (Figure 8). The BSM aero heat 
shield covers were locked in the fully opened position. 
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing 
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. 
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB 
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were 
missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward separation 
bolt appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. Paint was missing from eight 
areas on the aft center segment. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The K5NA closeout material on the upper strut fairing was 
intact. All three aft booster stiffener rings were damaged by 
water impact. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were 
S
intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. One 3"x2" area of MSA-2 was missing 
from the aft skirt acreage TPS near the 1926 ring frame between 
the -Y and +Z axes. The remaining material was slightly sooted 
(Figure 9). 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated. 
Approximately ten percent of the EPON shim material on both HDP 
#7 and #8 aft skirt support structure was missing prior to 
splashdown. The substrates were sooted/charred. 
.
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The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened 
position.
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S The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were 
intact.
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Approximately ten percent of the EPON shim material was 
missing prior to splashdown. The substrate was sooted. 
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7.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
STS-57 was the sixteenth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the hoiddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent . of the ordnance 
debris. 
A recent change to the disassembly procedures by SRB Project 
(DCN 009 1OMNL-0035) eliminated the weighing of frangible nut 
pieces and ordnance fragments in the DCS containers unless: 1) 
debris is observed in the launch films; 2) the DCS plunger has 
an anomalous appearance during disassembly; or, 3) visual 
inspection of the expected DCS contents reveals the absence of 
any pieces. 
High speed launch film showed the loss of two frangible nut 
pieces from the HDP #2 DCS at liftoff. Due to this anomaly, the 
contents of the DCS #2 housing was weighed. A total of 1.165 
pounds of debris were lost sometime after launch. 
% of Nut without	 % of Ordnance 
HDP #
	
2 Large Halves	 Fragments	 % Overall 
2	 5	 21	 11 
SRB Post LaunchAnomalies are listed in Section 10. 
.
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was 
conducted 1-2 July 1993 at the Kennedy Space Center on Shuttle 
Landing Facility (SLF) runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing 
Facility bay #1. This inspection was performed to identify 
debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The 
Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 106 hits, of which 12 had a 
major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not 
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to 
SSME vibration! acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A 
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 40 previous 
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known 
debris sources), indicates that both the total number of hits 
and the number of hits one inch or larger is less than average 
(reference Figures 10-13). 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 75 hits, of 
which 10 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice 
and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources. 
The following table breaks down the STS-57 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
. 
HITS > 1"	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 10 75 
Upper surface 1 21 
Right side 0 3 
Left side 1 2 
Right OHS Pod 0 3 
Left OMS Pod 0 2
TOTALS	 12	 106 
The largest tile damage site measured 3.5" x 0.75" x 0.375" and 
was located on the RH lower surface outboard of the nose 
landing gear door. 
A cluster of 8 hits with maximum depths of 0.375 inches just 
forward of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical may be indicative of 
impacts from higher density materials, such as ice. 
No anomalies were noted on the RCC nosecap or wing leading edge 
panels. However, AFRSI blankets near the F3D and F1F thrusters 
were discolored.
. 
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FIGURE 10. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 11. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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. No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in good condition for a landing on the KSC runway. 
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1 and EO-3 appeared to have 
functioned properly. The EO-2 debris plunger was obstructed by 
ordnance fragments. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation 
ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. 
A 15-inch long piece of LH2 ET/ORB umbilical foam with red 
silicone sponge purge seal, which should have remained with the 
ET during separation, adhered to the Orbiter half of the 
umbilical near the 4-inch flapper valve. Post landing analysis 
revealed the foam fractured during ET separation and concluded 
there was an inadequate RTV dam to prevent foam adherence to 
the curtain attach plate. 
A 7/16" x 3/32" screw from the purge barrier retainer lay on 
the runway below the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cavity. A nutplate 
with threads matching the screw was found wedged in a cavity on 
the ET door. 
A piece of foam 3-inches long adhered to a tile on the RH ET 
door near the hinge line. The foam had been compressed into the 
thermal barrier when the door was closed, but apparently did 
not affect the seal during re-entry. According to post flight 
. laboratory analysis, the foam did not match the External Tank 
acreage thermal protection system (TPS) CPR and was most likely 
MBO foam from the umbilical. 
Orbiter windows #2, #3, #4, and #5 exhibited moderate hazing. 
Only a very light haze was present on the other windows. Some 
streaks were visible on windows #2, #3 and #4. Surface wipes 
were taken from all windows for laboratory analysis. 
No samples were taken from tile damage sites or RCC panels. 
Tile damage on the base heat shield was average. The SSME Dome 
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket sacrificial panels 
were intact, missing no material, and in excellent condition. 
One tile at the aft edge of the vertical stabilizer stinger was 
damaged by contact with the drag chute risers. A 2" x 1" piece 
of metal spring from the inside left surface of the 
rudder/speed brake was embedded in a vertical stabilizer 
stinger tile near the rudder hinge. 
Runway 33 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel 
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. 
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed S immediately after landing. All Orbiter drag chute hardware was recovered. No organic (bird) debris or other hardware was found 
on the runway.
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This flight marked the eighth use of the Orbiter drag chute. 
Aside from the damage to the vertical stabilizer stinger tile, 
the drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag 
chute hardware appeared to be in good condition. 
The Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the-
surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle (per OSD 
VO9AJO.095). Twenty-one minutes after landing, the Orbiter 
nosecap RCC was 179 degrees F. Twenty-four minutes after 
landing, the RH wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 140 degrees 
and panel #17 was 127 degrees F (reference Figure 14). 
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits 
and the number of hits one inch or larger was less than average 
when compared to previous missions (reference Figures 15-16) 
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 
10 . 0.
. 
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FIGURE .4. STS- 57 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREME1TS AS 
RECORDED BY THE SHUtTLE ThERMAL IMAGER 
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F I GURE 15. ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS-14(41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS-1 7(41-0) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-I) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R. 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
STS-47 3 48 11 108 
STS-52 6 152 16 290 
STS-53 11 145 23 240 
STS-54 14 80 14 131 
STS-56 18 94 36 156 
STS-55 10 128 13 143 
AVERAGE 14.6 94.1 22.1 133.4 
SIGMA 7.4 45.7 10.9 61.0 
STS-57.
MISSIONS STS-23, 24,25,26, 26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES: 
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Overall view of OV-105 right side. Endeavour made the

16th KSC landing on Runway 33 on 1 July 1993. 
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Overall view of the Orbiter nose. Forward facing windows were 
moderately hazed. Note discoloration of the AFRSI near the F3D 
and F1F thrusters.
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• Tile damage on the base heat shield was average. The SSME Dome 
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket sacrificial panels 
were intact and missing no material. 
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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Visual inspection of the right ET door (L02 side) revealed a 
3" x 1" piece of foam adhering to a tile near the hinge line. 
The foam had been compressed into the thermal barrier when the 
door was closed, but apparently did not affect the seal. 
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The left ET/ORB attach point (EO-2) hole plugger had 
not seated and was obstructed by ordnance fragments 
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ordnance devices functioned properly. Note piece of umbilical 
foam adhering to the plate adjacent to the 4-inch disconnect. 
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• A 15-inch long piece of foam with red purge se:., which should 
have remained with the ET during separation, adhered to the LH2 
ET/ORB unthilical near the 4-inch flapper valve. 
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A small screw from the purge barrier retainer was found on the 
. runway below the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cavity. A nutplate with 
threads matching the screw, shown here, was wedged in a cavity 
on the left ET door.
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.A 2" x 1" piece of metal spring was embedded in a tile

on the vertical stabilizer stinger near the hinge 
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aThe piece of metal spring originated from the inside surface
of the rudder/speed brake left panel 
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9.0 DEBRIS SNPLE L1B REPORTS 
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-105 Endeavour 
during the STS-57 post landing debris assessment at the Kennedy 
Space Center. The submitted samples consisted of 8 window wipes 
(Windows 1-8). The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC 
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition 
and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves 
the placing and correlating of particles/residues with respect 
to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. 
The debris sample result summaries are given by Orbiter 
location in the following paragraphs and shown in tabular form 
in Figure 17. 
Orbiter Windows 
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM 
exhaust (metallics, aluminum and ferrous corrosion), Orbiter 
Thermal Protection System (RTV, tile, insulation, tile filler), 
paints and primer from various sources, landing site products 
(alpha-quartz, calcite), window polish residue, and organic 
materials. A finding that has been previously observed (STS-50 
vertical stabilizer sample, STS-56 and STS-55 window samples) 
was the presence of "E-glass". Trace amounts of yellow paint 
were found in all of the 8 window samples and was attributed to 
facility/ground support equipment paint. Final results of the 
organic material analysis are still pending. There was no 
apparent vehicle damage related to any residual finding. 
STS-55 Organic Analysis 
The final results of the STS-55 organic analysis are also shown 
in this report. Types of identified materials included those 
associated with window covers (plastic polymers, foam/adhesive, 
rubber), RTV, and cellulosic (sample cloth). This variety of 
residuals, which were attributed to known sources, did not 
change significantly when compared to previous sample data 
(reference Figure 17) . No new findings were found in this 
analysis. 
New Findings 
This sampling set provided two new findings in debris residual 
post-flight samples. These new findings were obtained from the 
window samples and did not appear related to any debris damage 
problem. A building type of insulation and a possible teflon 
particle were detected. Additiona'i testing is continuing to 
identify and isolate the source for these findings. 
.
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, 17 post 
•	 launch anomalies, including six IFA candidates, were observed 
on the STS-57 mission. 
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY 
1. Three metal items (1-3/8" x 1/4" bolt, 5/8" x 1/4" bolt, 
7/8" diameter washer) lay on the MLP deck near HDP #8 between 
the sound suppression water pipe and SRB exhaust hole. 
2. The cable attached to the J2 electrical connector on the 
GUCP appeared to have excessive slack, which caused the cable 
to momentarily catch on a intertank access platform hand rail 
during retraction. 
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. At least 70 small divots, 3-4 inches in diameter, occurred 
on intertank stringers forward of the bipods. Seven small 
•	 divots were visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout between the bipods. 
2. Nine divots, 6-8 inches in diameter, occurred along a line 
on the -Y thrust panel on the +Z side of the EB fitting. As 
many as nine smaller divots were scattered on the -Y thrust 
panel on the -z side of the EB fitting (IFA candidate). 
3. A divot, 6-8 inches in diameter, was present in the -Y (LH) 
longeron closeout. 
4. Foam was missing from the +Y thrust strut flange and primer! 
metal substrate was exposed. 
5. The lightning contact strip was missing from the top of the 
L02 ET/ORB umbilical (IFA candidate). 
6. Red purge seal was missing from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
near the 4-inch disconnect (still attached to the Orbiter after 
landing) and at the top outboard section. A piece of white RTV 
drifting by the camera lens may also have originated from the 
top outboard section. TPS damage had occurred on the inboard 
side of the umbilical and a large piece of foam, which measured 
approximately 2 feet long by 4 inches wide by as much as 1 inch 
thick, had partially separated from the umbilical. TPS on the 
top surface of the umbilical had peeled back in two places. 
(IFA candidate).
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10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. A frangible nut web, 2-1/4" x 5/16", was found on the stud 
in hoiddown post (HDP) #2. (The loss of two frangible nut 
pieces from the stud hole was observed in the film review) 
2. The RH frustum had 46 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and 2 
areas of missing MSA-2. The LH frustum had 27 debonds over 
fasteners. 
3. Paint was missing and metal substrate was exposed in 
several, areas of the RH SP,M forward segment and LH aft center 
segment cases. 
4. Approximately 10 percent of the EPON shim material on both 
HDP #7 and #8 aft skirt support structure was missing prior to 
splashdown. The substrates were sooted/charred. 
10.4 ORBITER 
1. The EO-2 (LH2 side) debris plunger was obstructed by 
ordnance fragments. 
2. A 15-inch long piece of foam with red purge seal, which 
should have remained with the ET during separation, adhered to 
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near the 4-inch flapper valve. 
(IFA candidate) 
3. A piece of foam 3-inches long adhered to a tile on the RH 
ET door near the hingeline. The foam had been compressed into 
the thermal barrier when the door was closed, but apparently 
did not affect the seal during re-entry. 
4. A 7/16" x 3/32" screw from the purge barrier retainer lay 
on the runway below the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cavity. A nutplate 
with threads matching the screw was found wedged in a cavity on 
the ET door. (IFA candidate) 
5. A 2" x 1" piece of metal spring from the inside left 
surface of the rudder/speed brake was embedded in a vertical 
stabilizer stinger tile near the rudder hinge. (IFA candidate)
. 
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
[I
. 
S
87
August 6, 1993 
Greg Katnik 
MC[FV-MSD-22 
OSB Room 5203R 
KSC, Florida 32899 
Dear Greg, 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-57 Final Report, and was completed 
August 6, 1993. Publication numbers are LESC-30783 and JSC-25994-57. The actual 
document can be obtained through the LESC librazy/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project. 
Christine Dailey, Project Specialist 
Photo[FV Analysis Project 
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2,0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
	 S 
2.1.1.1	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras E-2, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-34, E-35, E-36, E-62, 
E-63, E-76, E-77, OTV-149, OTV-150, OTV-151, OTV-170, OTV-171) 
Normal vapors and ice debris were noted falling from the LH2 and L02 T-O TSM umbilical 
disconnect areas at Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) ignition through liftoff. None of the 
debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested. 
2.1.1.2	 LH2 and L02 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras E-1, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-25, E-30, E-31, 
E-40, E-52, OTV-i 09, OTV-154, OTV-163) 
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnect 
areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle. 
No follow-up action was requested.
. 
. 
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	 2.1.2	 Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 Debris from DCS at HDP M-2 
(Camera E-8) 
Figure 2.1.2.1	 Metallic Debris from DCS Stud Hole of the RSRB HDP M-2 
A metallic appearing piece of debris (see Figure 2.1.2.1) was noted to fall from the DCS 
stud hole of the RSRB hoiddown post M-2 at liftoff (13:07:23.048 UTC). 
2.1.2.2	 Debris near SRB HDPs at SRB Ignition 
(Cameras E-7, E-8, E-11, E-13) 
A small dark piece of debris came from behind the hoiddown post M-4 DCS and another 
dark piece of debris came from behind the east side of the LSRB hoiddown post M-6 
DCS at liftoff (13:02:22.000 UTC). Another single small dark piece of debris was noted 
near LSRB hoiddown post M-7 DCS area. The debris possibly originated from the DCS 
area. None of the DCS debris described appeared to strike the vehicle. 
A small flat dark piece of debris appeared to move toward and contact the outer surface 
of the RSRB support structure (foot) of hoiddown post M-2 (13:07:18.959 UTC). No 
damage was visible from the contact. 
C
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2.1.2.3	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E-8, E-11, E-12, E-15, E-26) 
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the Solid Rocket 
Booster (SRB) flame duct area after SRB ignition. The SRB flame duct debris seen on STS-57 
was not significant and required no analysis. 
	
2.1.2.4	 MLP Debris Near LSRB at Liftoff 
(Camera E-26) 
A small dark piece of debris (possibly SRB flame duct debris) was noted traveling south between 
the LSRB and the FSS at 13:07:22.623 UTC. The debris was first seen to the north of the SLV 
and traveled in an arch towards the Orbiter. The debris was not noted in any other cameras to 
allow a phototheodolite analysis of the trajectory and velocity, but did not appear to be in the 
vicinity of the Orbiter when the debris exited the field of view. No further analysis was 
completed. 
. 
S
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2.1.2.5	 Debris Near L02 Feedline 
(Cameras E-65, E-79) 
Figure 2.1.2.5	 Debris from L02 Feedline Joint 
A white piece of debris (probably ice, approximately 3 inches in length) appeared to 
originate from the joint on the L02 feedline near the forward biped (see Figure 2.1.2.4) 
and fall along the L02 feedline during liftoff on camera E-65. A smaller piece of debris 
was seen falling along the L02 feedline at a lower location during liftoff on camera E-79. 
Neither debris item was seen to contact the vehicle. 
2.1.2.6	 Debris Falls along North Side of ET

(Camera E-4) 
Two small white pieces of debris were noted falling along the north side of the ET (the side 
opposite of the Orbiter) at liftoff. These debris pieces might have originated from the GUCP 
area. 
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•	 2.13	 Debris after Liftoff 
2.13.1	 RCS Paper and Baggie Material Debris 
(Cameras E-34, E-35, E-40, E-52, E-54, E-59, E-65, E-207, E-212, E-218, 
E-222, E-223, E-224, OTV-149, OTV-161, OrV-i 70, KTV-21B) 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at liftoff, 
throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris 
sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter 
umbilicals. On the E-223 tracking camera view, RCS paper debris was seen to originate from the 
F2R and F4R RCS nozzles. None of the debris detected after liftoff was observed to strike the 
vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested. 
2.13.2	 Debris Near Left Wing at 15.6 Seconds MET 
(Cameras E-52, E-222, KTV-2iB) 
A light colored piece of debris fell along the body flap and aft into the SSME plume at 
approximately 15.6 seconds MET (13:07:37.576 UTC). This does not appear to be RCS paper 
debris. The debris was first noted near the inboard aft trailing edge of the left wing on the 
camera E-222 film. The debris was first seen near the LH2 TSM disconnect area on camera E-
52. 
2.13.3	 Multiple Pieces of Debris at 17 Seconds MET 
(Camera E-59) 
Multiple pieces of small light colored debris were noted on the ET side of the RSRB 
plume at approximately 17 seconds MET (13:07:39.244 UTC). 
.	
2.13.4
	 Debris Reported by Crew (Task #10) 
Shortly after launch, the crew was asked to give a report of any debris they noted during launch 
and ascent. Commander Ronald Grabe reported that the windows were clean. He also reported 
that detection of debris was made difficult by the sun position relative to the Orbiter. 
2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen) 
(Cameras E-2, E-19, E-20, OTV-i63, OTV-i 70, OTV-i71) 
Orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, was noted below the SSMEs near the left 
OMS nozzle and also north of the body flap at SSME ignition. Orange vapor was noted 
above the SSME #1 nozzle at 13:07:18.429 UTC on camera E-2. This phenomenon has been 
noted on many previous missions. 
2.2.2	 Green Vapor Near Left OMS Nozzle 
(Camera OTV-171) 
A greenish vapor was noted between SSME #1 and SSME #2 near the left OMS nozzle 
during SSME ignition. This phenomenon has been noted on previous missions. 
.
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2.2.3	 Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Ignition 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-19, E-20) 
Flashes were noted in the SSME #1 exhaust plume at 13:07:19.404 and 13:07:22.57 1 UTC. A 
flash was seen in the SSME #2 plume at 13:07:22.359 UTC. A flash was noted in the SSME #3 
exhaust plume at 13:07:19.860 IJTC. Flashes in SSME exhaust plumes have been seen on prior 
missions. No follow-up analysis was requested. 
2.2.4	 Hydrogen Burn Ignitor Flare 
(Cameras E-1, E-30, E-76, OTV-i 70) 
A hydrogen burn ignitor flare was noted at SSME startup. 
2.2.5	 Discoloration in RCS Port Covers 
(Cameras E-19, E-20, E-77, OTV-170, OTV-171) 
A discoloration of the L2U, L4U, and R4U RCS port covers was noted prior to liftoff. 
2.2.6	 Slack GH2 Vent Arm Retraction Lanyard
(Cameras E-42, E-50) 
During the GH2 vent arm retraction, the lanyard was slack and appeared to contact the hand 
railing of the FSS. 
2.2.7	 Firing Cable Remained Attached at HDP #4 
(Cameras E-7, E-15) 
A portion of the firing cable from hoiddown post M-4 remained attached to the RSRB after 
liftoff. 
2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 White Vapor Near SSME #3 
(Cameras E-6, E-31, OTV-109) 
A white vapor was noted near the north side of SSME #3 after liftoff on OTV-109. The white 
vapor off SSME #3 appeared normal on the camera E-6 view.
C 
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2.3.2	 Light Colored Streak in SSME Plume 
(Cameras E7'-204, ET-212) 
. 
Figure 2.3.2
	 Light Colored Streak in SSME plume at 38 seconds MET and 
Reference Image 
A light colored streak was noted in the SSME plume at approximately 38 seconds MET 
on ET-212. Figure 2.3.2 provides an image of the streak along with an image of an 
earlier time without the streak. A white puff (believed to be the same event seen from a 
different perspective) was noted at the same time and similar position on camera ET-204. 
2.3.3	 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras E-207, E-212, E-222) 
Multiple flares in the SSME exhaust plume were noted after the roll maneuver. The 
flares were seen at approximately 27.7, 33, 33.6, 36.2, and 36.3 seconds MET. Flares in 
the SSME exhaust plume have been seen on previous missions. 
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2.3.4	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
(Camera E-207) 
During ascent very slight body flap motion was noted on the E-207 tracking camera film. The 
magnitude of the motion seen on the STS-57 views was not sufficient to warrant further analysis. 
2.3.5	 Condensation Collar (Thsk #12) 
(Cameras E-204, E-207, E-208, E-211, E-212, E-220, E-222, 
E-223, E-224, ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-2 12, KTV-4B, KTV-5, 
KTV-13, KTV-21B) 
Dick Thomas of RI-D noted while watching the national news coverage of the launch of 
STS-57 that there may have been excessive vapor clouds around the SLV during ascent 
and that this vapor might be related to a cause of payload bay door seal damage which 
has occurred on several flights (e.g. STS-41, STS-40). His concern was for pressure 
spikes that the payload bay may be experiencing and thought he might have seen an 
ingestion of air into the payload bay. 
STS-57 video trackers were rescreened to see if there was any turbulence of the air 
around or entering into the payload bay doors at the seal areas. (The condensation 
occurred between mach 0.87 and mach 1.16.) The condensation collar in these views did 
not appear turbulent, however it was seen to pulse several times during ascent. (This 
event has been seen on several previous missions and is due to levels of moisture in the 
atmosphere that the SLV is traveling through.) There appeared to be no visible influx of 
air into the payload bay. The collar appeared to be separated from the Orbiter and did not 
actually touch the payload bay doors except at the forward end of the SLV where the 
condensation collar begins. The condensation also appeared to originate from the edges 
.	 of the wings, OMS pods, and the vertical stabilizer. This phenomenon has also been seen 
on previous missions and does not appear out of the ordinary. 
STS-40 video tracking views were also reviewed since this was the mission that had 
significant payload bay door seal damage. The analysis of these views was hampered due 
to numerous clouds in the area during ascent. In the areas where the collar was visible, 
the condensation was comparable to that of STS-57 in amount and shape and did not 
appear turbulent. 
2.3.6	 Linear Optical Effect 
(Cameras E-212, ET-212) 
A linear optical distortion along the aft portion of the SLV was noted at 13:08:15.85 1 UTC on 
the ET-212 long range video tracking view. Linear optical effects have been seen on previous 
mission long range tracking views. No follow up action is planned. 
2.3.7	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras ET-2 04 , fT-208, KTV-13, E-204, E-208, E-212) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-57, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 92 seconds MET on KTV-13 and the end was noted at 
approximately 115 seconds MET on Camera ET-204. See Appendix D, Task #1 for a 
summary of recirculation start and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
C
STS-57 Final Report
96
2.0	 Summary. of Significant Events
. 
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET) 
KTV-13 92 107 
ET-204 93 115 
ET-208 92 107 
*E204 94 109 
E-208
—93 —104 
E-212
—93 -102
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION 
2.3.8	 Dark Puffs in SRB Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras ET-204, ET-207, E-208) 
Dark puffs in the SRB exhaust plume were noted at approximately 114 seconds MET (just 
prior to plume brightening). This phenomenon has been noted on previous missions. 
2.4	 DTO-312 
2.4.1	 Analysis of Onboard Camcorder Downlink of the ET (Task #11) 
Approximately, three and half minutes of video of the ET was downlinked approximately 
8 hours after ET separation. The first video view occurred approximately 9 minutes after 
ET separation and ended approximately 14 minutes after separation. The video imagery 
was screened prior to the screening of the handheld or the umbilical well films of the ET 
separation. A rotational analysis was performed in the same manner that would be 
performed using the handheld photography. The tank was measured to have a tumble 
rate of 0.58 degrees per second compared to 2.2 degrees per second as measured from the 
35 mm handheld photography. More details of this analysis are located in Appendix D, 
Task #11. A separation velocity could not be performed because internal camera 
orientation could not be determined. 
The video screening revealed two divots on the -z axis of the ET, possible divots on the 
LH2 intertank near the bipod and possible divots on the -Y side of the LH2 intertank 
interface. The divots noted on the -z axis were determined to be a single divot after 
observation of the ET handheld photography. The possible divots noted on the LH2 
intertank near the biped were confirmed by the handheld photography to be multiple 
divots on the intertank acreage. The possible divotsnoted on the -Y axis of the LH2 
intertank interface were also confirmed by the handheld photography. Although the 
video did not show all of the damaged areas, it did yield near real time information about 
the condition of the ET. 
2.4.2	 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis (Task #6) 
(STS-57-03-01 through 37) 
STS-57 crew performed DTO-312 acquiring 37 views of the external tank (El) from a 
single roll of 35 mm film. Apparent damage to the external tank thermal protection 
system (TPS) on the intertank acreage was observed. The entire ET was photographed 
except the side away from the FSS as the vehicle sits on the pad, or the +Y axis. 
The photographs were taken by Jeff Wisoff using Nikon F4 camera with a 300 mm lens 
and a 2x extender (Method 3). The first photograph was taken 6 minutes and 7 seconds 
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after ET separation while the ET was at a distance of 933 meters from the Orbiter. The 
last photograph was taken at 11 minutes and 55 seconds after ET separation while the 
Orbiter was 2,234 meters from the Orbiter. At the start of photography, the ET tumbled 
at 2.2 degrees per second. The analysis results were reported to the Mission Evaluation 
Room (MER) Manager and to the standard distribution. The results of this analysis are 
located in Appendix D, Task #6. 
. 
.
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Figure 2.4.2	 Onboard Handheld Camera View of the ET 
. 
.
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
Nine to ten divots were visible on the ET intertank TPS acreage to the right of the 
forward LSRB attach point (1). Five divots were visible on the LH2 intertank between 
the ET access door and the LSRB forward attach point (2). Two large divots were seen 
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.	 on the lower LH2 intertank interface. One was located below the LSRB forward attach 
point (3) and the other was on the -z side of the ET. Multiple divots were seen near the 
ET/Orbiter attach bipod (4). Pieces of white debris were visible in the background on 
many of the frames (5). 
A divot was visible on the aft vertical thrust strut near the ET L02 umbilical. This 
damage is being worked as part of the divot problem reported on the STS-56 ET (inflight 
anomaly number STS-56-T-OOl). The area surrounding the strut is more clearly visible 
from 35 mm umbilical well camera (see Section 2.4.4). 
A single large divot on the LH2 intertank interface below the ET access door (-Z side) 
measured 12 inches and a single large divot below the LSRB forward attach point (-Y 
side) measured 19 inches. The 9 divots to the right of the LSRB forward attach point 
were measured to range between 6 and 7 inches. The ET/Orbiter separation velocity was 
determined to be 3.74 meters per second which is slightly less than that seen on recent 
missions. 
2.43	 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of the SRB and ET 
Separation (Task #5) 
The 16 mm motion picture film taken from the Orbiter LH2 umbilical was reviewed. The 
focal length of the camera lens was 5 mm. This 16 mm motion picture film showed 
LSRB and ET separation along with the normal venting and debris associated with these 
events. 
The 16 mm film sequence of the LSRB separation has good exposure and focus. 
•	 Multiple pieces of light colored TPS debris of various shapes and sizes are visible before, 
during, and after the separation of the SRBs. Chipping and erosion of the TPS on the 
base of the electrical cable tray and the aft ET/Orbiter and ET/LSRB attach struts are 
visible. A piece of insulation on the base of the electrical cable tray was seen to detach 
prior to SRB separation. The loose end of this insulation eventually broke off and fell 
from view. The LSRB separation appeared normal. A dark piece of debris was visible 
on the ET side of the LSRBIET attach just after SRB separation. There were three bright 
marks or reflections visible on the LSRB attach on the face exposed after the LSRB 
detached from the external tank. 
The initial exposure of the 16 mm film during the second film segment of the separation 
of the external tank was very dark because the sun was behind the ET. The view 
improved during the umbilical well purge. Multiple pieces of white debris (ice/frost) and 
white vapors were in view. After the umbilical purge, the white debris continued to be in 
view although the view was again very dark. Periodically, orange or light colored vapors 
come into view that were probably caused by RCS firings. 
.
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Figure 2.4.3a
	 16 mm Camera View of the ET LH2 Umbilical 
After the external tank separated from the Orbiter, a piece of loose insulation or foam was 
visible on the view of the inboard side of the ET LH2 umbilical. This piece of foam was 
over 20 inches long and 4 inches wide as determined by comparison to known structures 
on the face of the LH2 umbilical (1). Two possible pieces of detached white RTV were 
visible on the inboard and forward sides of the LH2 umbilical (2). A segment of the red 
RTV seal that surrounds the outer border of the LH2 umbilical appeared to be missing 
near the four inch line connect (3). The large circle of ice in the LH2 seventeen inch line 
orifice is an expected occurrence and has been seen on the previous mission umbilical 
well films (4). 
A slender piece of white debris that appeared to be flexing was visible on the left side of 
the film view of the ET LH2 umbilical after ET separation. This may be a piece of white 
RTV that came from the LH2 umbilical. 
.
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Figure 2.4.3b
	
	 Closeout Picture of the LH2 Umbilical taken by the 
KSC Debris Team 
A picture of the Orbiter LH2 umbilical (Figure 2.4.3b) taken by the KSC Debris Team 
-
	
	 after landing indicated that approximately 10 inches of foam material remained near the 
four inch line connect. The 16 mm umbilical well camera film of the ET LI-U anomalies 
•	 was shown to the JSC Propulsion and Power Division/EP2 engineers. The JSC engineers 
suggested that the closeout foam placed near the four inch line connect prior to launch 
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.	 may be sticking causing some of the RTV and foam to be pulled loose during ET 
separation. 
Very small pieces of debris were noted inside the umbilical well camera housing. Pieces 
of white debris continued to move across the field of view until the end of the film. The 
ET had a slight lean to the right by the end of the film. 
Poor imagery due to the back lighting from the sun significantly hindered analysis. The 
detailed screening sheets are located in Appendix D, Task #5. 
2.4.4	 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of the ET Separation 
(Task #5) 
Sixty-four well focused 35 mm frames were obtained of the external tank separation. The 
first six frames were too dark for analysis because the sunlight was blocked by the 
external tank. Frames 7 through 27 were dark but usable. A lens flare hampered analysis 
after the twenty-seventh frame. The 35 mm umbilical camera screening sheets are 
located in Appendix D, Task #5. 
S
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Figure 2.4.4a
	 35 mm Camera View of the ET L02 Umbilical 
TPS erosion was visible on the right side of the L02 umbilical (1). A red seal around the 
EO-3 fitting above the L02 umbilical was detached (2). The lightning contact strip at the 
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•	 forward end of the L02 umbilical appeared to be missing (3). JSC engineers were 
consulted and according to their information the electric contact strip was present prior to 
launch. Possible TPS damage or a piece of loose insulation was visible near the upper 
left corner of the L02 umbilical (4). This possible loose insulation may be related to a 
three inch piece of ET foam that was found during the post landing inspection of the 
Orbiter L02 umbilical by the debris inspection team. This three inch piece of foam 
adhered to a tile on the L02 door near the hinge line according to the post landing 
inspection team report. A section of TPS was missing from the forward end of the ET aft 
+Y L02 vertical thrust strut (5). The missing TPS appeared to have left a deep divot. A 
primed or bare metal surface was visible at the center of the missing TPS area. An 
engineer at MSFC stated that the missing TPS is being worked as part of the divot 
problem reported on the STS-56 external tank (inflight anomaly number STS-56-T-OO1). 
TPS erosion was visible on a aft bracket over the L02 feedline at approximately station 
1958 (6). Small, white marks were visible on the TPS to the left of the L02 feedline at 
the base of the LH2 tank (7). 
.
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Figure 2.4.4b	 35 mm Camera View of the Bipod and LH2 
Tank/intertank Region of the External Tank 
Multiple pieces of white debris were imaged between the camera and the external tank. 
The white debris appeared to be ice (1). Multiple white "popcorn" marks were visible on 
the intertank stringers forward of the bipod (2). Several small white marks or divots were 
visible between the biped legs on the LH2 tankfintertank closeout flange (3). Two divots 
less than six inches in size were visible on the intertank closeout flange to the right of the 
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L02 feedline (+Y axis) (4). One divot lessthan six inches in size was visible on the LH2 
tank TPS just below the intertank/LH2 tank closeout flange on the +Y axis (5). 
2.5	 On Orbit Events 
No on orbit events were requested to be analyzed this mission 
2.6	 Landing Events 
2.6.1	 Landing Sink Rate from Video (Task #3) 
(Camera KTV-33) 
Camera TV-33 was used to determine the video nose gear and main gear sink rate for 
STS-57. For both the main gear sink rate and the nose gear sink rate, a known length of 
Orbiter black tile was used as the scalar reference. This scalar reference was 78 inches in 
length. After the distance values were determined and scaled, a trend of these distances 
was calculated to smooth the data and determine the sink rate from the slope of the data. 
Left main gear sink rate was determined to be 19.9 inches per second or 1.7 feet per 
second and the right main gear sink rate was determined to be 17.5 inches per second or 
1.5 feet per second. 
Nose gear sink rate was determined to be 1.2 feet per second, which is consistent with the 
film analysis. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D, Task #3. 
.	 2.6.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3) 
(Cameras EL-9, EL-12) 
Camera EL-9 film viewing the aft end of the Orbiter was used to determine the sink rate of the 
main gear. The good view provided by this camera allowed the observation that both inboard 
tires contacted the runway surface prior to the respective outboard tires. The left inboard tire 
(44.5 inches) was used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered for 1.0 19 seconds prior to 
landing through touchdown. The motion of the wheel was measured and a linear regression was 
applied on this normalized vertical distance versus time data to find the actual rate. The main 
gear sink rate was determined to be 1.6 feet per second which is well within the current threshold 
limits. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 18 seconds after main gear touchdown. Camera 
EL-12 viewing the left side of the Orbiter near the point of nose gear touchdown was used to 
scale the measurements. Data was gathered for the 1.967 seconds prior to nose gear touchdown. 
The distance between the nose wheel and the runway surface was computed and a linear 
regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance versus time data to find the actual 
rate. The nose gear sink rate was determined to be 1.7 feet per second. 
•	
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D, Task #3. 
.
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2.6.3	 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9) (Cameras EL-7, EL-9, EL-JO) 
The landing of Discovery at the end of mission STS-57 marked the ninth use of the 
Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected. 
Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the 
views from the film cameras EL-i, EL-9 and EL-lO. This analysis is used to support the 
improvement of the aerodynamic math models currently in use. The maximum 
horizontal chute deflection was approximately 5.1 degrees. 
The following drag chute times were acquired from cameras EL-9, EL-b, EL-12, and 
EL-19. 
12:52:24.452 IJTC Drag chute initiation 
12:52:25.2 16 UTC Pilot chute full inflation 
12:52:27.07 1 UTC Drag chute inflation in reefed configuration 
12:52:30.326 UTC Drag chute inflation in disreefed configuration 
12:52:56.208 UTC Drag chute release
Graphical representations of the results of this analysis may be found in Appendix D, 
Task #9. 
	
2.7	 Other Normal Events 
Other normal events observed include: ice buildup on the SSME vent nozzles; slight vapor from 
the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent on the ET and frost on the vent louvers, flexing of the base heat 
shield at SSME startup; slight motion of the body flap and elevons between SSME ignition and 
liftoff; ice and vapor from the GUCP during SSME startup and arm reiraction; pressure waves 
visible in the SLV exhaust cloud at liftoff; vapor from drain hole on trailing edge of the rudder 
speed brake at tower clear, debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff; slight roll 
maneuver overshoot and adjustment white puffs in SSME exhaust plume during and after the 
roll maneuver, ET aft dome outgassing and vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff; 
charring of the ET aft dome during ascent; minor wind shear in the SLV exhaust plume after 
liftoff; SRB plume brightening. 
	
2.8	 Launch Facility Events 
Normal events related to the launch facilities are FSS deluge water spray activation and MLP 
water dump activation. 
Water leaks in the MLP J-Pipes near hoiddown posts M-3 and M-4 were observed.
ED 
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-57, the fourth flight of the 
Orbiter Endeavour was conducted June 21, 1993 at approximately 
8:07 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive photographic and 
video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to determine 
proper operation of the ground and flight hardware. Cameras 
(video and cine) providing this coverage are located on the fixed 
service structure (FSS), mobile launch platforin(MLP), LC-39B 
perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and downrange tracking 
sites. 
II.	 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-57 included, but were not limited to the 
following:
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
c. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Hoiddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission: 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CANERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-four of fifty-seven requested 
cameras as well as video from all twenty-four requested cameras. 
The following table illustrates the camera data received at MSFC 
for STS-57.
S 
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-57 
4
16mm	 35mm	 Video 
MLP 22 0 4 
FSS 7 3 
Perimeter 3 4 6 
Tracking 0 13 11 
Onboard 3 2 0
Totals	 35	 19	 24 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-57 was considered good. 
Tracking camera coverage was degraded due to cloud cover and 
atmospheric conditions. Cameras E-54 and E-213 provided no data 
and were not shipped to MSFC. Camera E-57 did not operate due to 
a mechanical failure. Timing information on camera E-3 was 
invalid. Timing data was lost on cameras E-1 and E-4 after 
approximately T+6 seconds. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly but 
ran out of film prior to water impact. The astronauts carried a 
35mm hand-held camera to record film for evaluating the ET TPS 
integrity after ET separation. Thirty-seven frames of data were 
recorded. A 35mm camera was mounted in the right umbilical well 
to record ET separation and ET TPS integrity. Sixty-four frames 
of data were recorded. A 16mm motion picture camera was mounted 
in the left umbilical well to record during and after SRB and ET 
separation. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
.
	
	
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
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SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and uinbiiicais; 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors and 
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon 
motions were noted during ascent. 
From the on-board cameras, typical charring of aft dome 
noted, BSM burn scar noted and typical TPS erosion and debris 
(ice/frost) were noted. 
b. SRB Hoiddown Post M-2 Debris 
Figure 1 is a film frame taken from camera E-8 showing the 
first of two events of frangible nut material falling from the 
hold-down post M-2 hole. These debris behaved typically of 
previously observed frangible nut material, falling down into the 
shoe area without striking any flight hardware. 
c. ET TPS Divots 
Figure 2 shows the "popcorning" of the TPS forward of the 
bipod strut on the intertank and the one large divot aft of the 
bipod strut on the LH2 tank. Figure 3 shows approximately ten 
divots on the intertank near the LSRB forward attach point and 
the one large divot at the L02 tank/intertank interface. Figure 
4 shows the divots noted on the leading edge of the thrust strut 
near the ET base. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the SRB 
holddown posts numbers N-i, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION	 TIME (UTC) 
N-i	 E-9	 172:13:07:21.998 
M-2	 E-8	 172:13:07:21.998 
M-5	 E-12	 172:13:07:21.997 
M-6	 E-13	 172:13:07:21.996 
b. ET Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 32 inches. Figure 5 is a data plot showing. 
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and 
vertical directions. These data were derived from camera E-79. 
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c. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-57 was determined to be 
172:13:09:26.78 UTC as recorded by camera E-207. 
. 
£
116
I 
Figure 1. 
.
	 Frangible nut material front hoiddown post 14-2. 
.
	 1
4 4 
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Figure 2. 
Popcorning of TPS near bipod strut and large divot on LH2 tank. 
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.Figure 4. 
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Figure 3.
Divots on intertank near left SRB attach point. 
Divots on thrust strut. 
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Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary 
.
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Space Systems Division 
Rockwell International Corporation 
.	 12214 Lakewood Boulevard 
Downey, California 90241 
August 2, 1993
Rockwell 
International 
In Reply Refer to 93MA2 128 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-57 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering Photographic Analysis 
Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle Program Launch and Landing 
Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document (NSTS 08244). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated t 
determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) providing this coverage 
are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch 
. Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking sites for the 
STS-57 launch conducted on June 21, 1993, at approximately 6:07 a.m. (PDT) from the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on July 1, 1993 at KSC at 5:52 a.m. 
(PDT). 
Rockwell received launch films from 82 cameras (58 cine, 24 video) and landing films from 
24 cameras (14 cine, 10 video) to support the STS-57 photographic evaluation effort. Three 
films, E54, E57 and E213 were not available due to camera malfunction. 
All ground cameras coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, FSS and 
tracking cameras were good, however, the tracking film cameras and videos was hampered 
by clouds. 
Overall, the films showed STS-57 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from the 
ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to the Orbiter 
Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual condensation and water vapors 
were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB stiffener rings and dissipated alter the completion 
of the roll maneuver. 
a
(Packing Sheet No. DM93-152i) 
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Vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring of the ET 
aft dome, recirculation and brightening of the SRB plumes were visible and normal. Booster 
separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation also appeared to be normal, although 
clouds hampered the analysis of many of the long-range tracking cameras. 
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge water was 
activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were activated at approximatelY 1 
second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. All blast deflection shields closed prior 
to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as 
designed. The ET GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no 
rebound. No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen dispersal 
system hardware. 
STS-57 was the sixteenth flight with the optimized attach.link in the SRB hoiddown support 
post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is designed to increase the plunger 
velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the holddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. 
This prevents frangible nut fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, 
while not increasing the probability of a holddown bolt hang-up. 
No major or significant events were observed or identified. Two items that merit mentioning 
(not considered an anomaly) are the condensation "puft" and the three inch piece of ET 
foam found during the post landing inspection of the Orbiter L0 2 umbilical by the debris 
inspection team. These events and other events noted by the Rockwell film/video users 
during the review and analysis of the STS-57 photographic items are summarized in the 
following comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS 
A question was raised regarding the intermittent condensation "puffs" observed on the 
Space Shuttle during transonic flight at the Orbiter crew module and payload bay area. 
The issue was whether condensation that formed around the Orbiter was related to 
pressure spikes measured in the payload bay area on previous missions. Analysis 
showed that during transonic flow, the flow expansion around the Orbiter will cause 
local pressure and temperature to drop. When the local temperature drops below the 
dew point the condensation phenomenon occurs. This event causes no adverse effects 
on the Orbiter. 
These conclusions were derived from an analytical calculation performed, based on the 
prelaunch weather balloon data, prelaunch estimate of the STS-57 trajectory, and the 
aerodynamic pressure distributions on the Orbiter during ascent. No follow on work 
is scheduled for this issue;
£ 
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2. Review of the 35mm Umbilical Well camera views of the ET separation shows 
possible TPS damage or a piece of loose insulation near the upper left corner of the 
. L02 umbilical. This possible loose insulation may be related to the three inch piece of 
ET foam that was found during the post landing inspection of the Orbiter L02 
umbilical by the debris inspection team. No additional follow on work is scheduled for 
this issue. 
On the 16mm LH2 Umbilical Well Camera film of the SRB and ET separation a piece 
of loose insulation or foam was noted on the inboard side of the ET LH2 umbilical and 
possibly two pieces of detached white RTV are visible on the inboard sides of the 2 
umbilical. Also, a piece of red RTV seal around the outer border of the LH2 umbilical 
appears to be missing near the four inch line connect. JSC and R1/DNY engineers 
suggested that this may be caused by the close out foam: placed near the four inch line 
connect, prior to launch, sticking and pulling some of the RTV and foam loose during 
ET separation. No follow on work is planned. 
On cameras E-2, E-3, E-19 and E-20, a white flash was noted in the SSME l plume 
at liftoff. Flashes have been observed on previous missions and are probably caused 
by small amounts of contaminants in the main engine. No follow-up action is planned. 
4. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen below the SSME's and the 
body flap just prior to SSME ignition on cameras (OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-171, E-
2, E-19 and E-20. This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous 
missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
5. On camera E-8, a metallic appearing piece of debris was noted falling from the DCS 
.	 stud hole of the right SRB holddown post M-2 at liftoff. This debris did not appear to 
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned. 
6. On cameras E-42 and E-50, the GH2 Vent Arm retraction lanyard did not reel in and 
was slack. No follow-up film analysis action is planned. 
7. Multiple pieces of debris particles were seen falling aft of the Orbiter during and after 
completion of the roll maneuver on cameras E-212, E-218, E-222, and E-223. The 
debris was probably RCS paper covers or ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
Flares and flashes seen in the SSME exhaust plume (E-207, E-212, 
E-222) during ascent. These observations have been seen in the SSME plumes on 
previous missions and are understood to be burning of propellant impurities including 
RCS paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
I 
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The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed on STS-
57. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information only: 
• Ice debris fhlling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the hoiddown post areas 
and MLP 
• Charring of the ET aft dome 
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff 
• Butcher paper .11ing from the RCS 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar 
to those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
• Slag in SRB plume after separation 
• Condensation around the SLV during ascent 
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff. 
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up. 
10. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DVO8P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent clearance 
separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET vent umbilical 
structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances between the left 
SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films showed nominal launch 
pad hardware performance, and no anomalies were observed for the SRB; body 
trajectory. 
11. Cameras E7-16 and E27-28 - OMRSD File LX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DVO8P.020 
requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to verify nozzle to 
holddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No anomalies were 
observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive clearances between the SRB 
nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
. 
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12. The landing of STS-57 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility. 
. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous events were observed. 
The flight marked the ninth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute system 
performed as expected. All sequenced events occurred as expected and no hardware 
anomalies were observed. 
During the post-landing inspection slight tile damage on the base of the vertical 
stabilizer stinger above the door for the drag chute was noted. No follow-up action 
has been requested. 
This letter is of particular interest to Messers W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and C. F. Martin (MK-
SIO-2) at NASAJJSC and NASAIKSC respectively. The Integration Contractor contact is 
R. Raxnon at (310) 922-3679. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
Space Systems Division 
J. A. Wolfelt 
Chief Engineer 
System Integration 
RRicj 
cc: G. Della Longa, BC4, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
W. J. Gaylor, VF2, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
H. S. Brown, MK-SIO-2, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
D. Pitts, SN 15, NASAJJSC, Houston, TX 
0. Katnik, T\'-MSD-22, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
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